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THE FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
REQUIRING UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION'
By

WILLIAM L. MAI-mEWS, JR.*

CHAPTER VIII

INCOME TAXES
SECTION 1.

In General
The constitutionality of legislation imposing a tax on income has
been so widely litigated and frequently discussed that any further pursuit of the Problem tends to be repetitious, 330 but it is impossible to
appreciate fully the relation of the uniformity provisions to a modern
exercise of the taxing power without some consideration of their function as it pertains to this type of tax. In fact, frequency of litigation
has not minimized noticeably the difficulties inherent in reconciling
this method of taxation with the fundamental law In some instances
the problem has been avoided by amending the constitution, but more
often it has been necessary to work out some judicial explanation which
will permit the legislature to impose an essentially distinctive tax without major distortion of existing constitutional provisions and the
standards of fairness and equality in taxation expressed in them. As
shown m the discussion of other kinds of taxes, 33i the connection between the uniformity provisions and any tax legislation centers on a
determination of the nature of the tax imposed, and this is especially
* This is the last of four articles based on a thesis written in partial fulfillment
of requirements for the S.J.D. degfee at the University of Michigan Law School.
The first three installments appeared in the November, January and March issues
of the Journal.
** A.B. Western Kentucky State College; LL.B. University of Kentucky; LL.M.,
S.J.D. Umersity of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington.
See generally: Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MINN. L. REV. 127
(1933); Brown, ConstitutionalLimitations on Progressive Taxation of Gross Income,
22 IOWA L. REv. 246 (1937); Notes, State Income Tax Laws and the Uniformity
Clause 3 ROCKy MT. L. REv. 32 (1930); State Income Tax Laws and the Uniformity
Clause 5 Rocw.v MT. L. REV. 70 (1932); Rottschaefer, A State Income Tax and the

Minnesota Constitution, 12 MIxNN. L. REv. 683 (1928); Note, Is Any Desirable Type
of General Income Tax Constitutional ti

Illinois, 35 ILL. L. REv. 730 (1941); Allen,

Limitations of Uniformity Provisions of State Constitution Upon Income Tax
Legislation, 11 TAx MAC. 440, 464 (1933).
,Li See discussion supra p. 187 et seq.
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true of the income tax. As emphasized before also, 332 the normal
judicial technique for deciding this constitutional problem rests
squarely on a comparison of the kind of tax involved with the pertinent
constitutional phraseology Thus the opinions m the income tax cases
afford ample opportunity to see the extent to which judicial thinking
on constitutional questions regarding taxation is dependent on a conceptualistic and analytical method. There are two factors, however,
which do cause the courts to abandon or modify traditional notions
and techniques in passing on the validity of an income tax.
In the first place, the distinctive nature of a tax on income quite
often forces some deviation from the practice of letting the character
of the tax determine the uniformity question entirely As long as the
critical features of the statutory scheme are simple, direct and similar
to some familiar tax pattern, it is possible to solve the basic legal problem of reconciling a necessary use of the taxing power with the constitution by labeling the tax. But the normal tax statute devised to reach
income is sufficiently complex and different to make judicial analysis
of it unusually difficult if not impossible. Nor do the courts have
much success in precisely categorizing an income tax by comparing it
with taxes whose nature is well-settled by precedent. In other words,
the labeling technique is particularly inadequate where a distinctive
type of tax is involved, and this inadequacy often results in a conscious
and realistic consideration of how the constitutional provisions should
be used.
In the second place, the enactment of income tax legislation frequently is the occasion for sharp political clashes among the various
segments of the community, and the courts are not immune to these
controversies. The constitutionality of many state income tax statutes
has been litigated against a background of conflicting economic and
political interests at a time when the need for revenue to meet pressing social problems and the demand for a reallocation of the tax burden
were critical. The courts are not able in every instance to conceal the
influence of this fact on their decisions by drawing nice distinctions
as to the nature of the tax. Again, they have to determine directly or
indirectly how the constitution should be used.
Although the factors described make the income tax cases a good
source for ideas about the function of the uniformity provisions, it is
inaccurate to suggest that the consequences of the traditional approach
to constitutional uniformity are avoided generally m income tax legislation. In the cases the nature of the tax is the decisive thing more
132See discussion supra p. 54 ot seq.
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often than not; and, in our attempt here to isolate those implications
in certain illustrative decisions which point to a clearer understanding
of the role of the uniformity provisions, it seems appropriate to examine the usual judicial explanations or theories as to the nature of
an income tax in such a manner as to evaluate their effect on the constitutionality of legislation imposing this type of tax.
There are at least four rather clearly defined theories as to the legal
nature of an income tax: (1) An income tax is a tax on the property
from which the income is derived. (2) An income tax is a tax on income
as property (3) An income tax is a property tax, but it is not the kind
of tax on property which the constitution requires to be imposed
uniformly, proportionally or according to value. (4) An income tax
is an excise tax, or at least is sut generts. Although all four are used
to determine whether a tax on income is a property tax, each involves
certain peculiarities of application which are quite important to the
constitutional fate of a particular statute.
SErION

2.

As A Tax On Property
The idea that a tax on income derived from property is a tax on
property is a kind of "ultimate burden" rationalization which received
considerable impetus as a result of the famous (or infamous) Pollock
Cases. 3 33 Obviously it is of little value where the statute purports to
reach income derived from some source other than property, and it is
equally inadequate as a comprehensive explanation of a tax limited to
income traceable to property 334 Nevertheless, it has been used to
bring an income tax within the scope of uniformity provisions where
the wording of the constitution is explicitly or inferentially limited to
property taxation.
To some extent this use is attributable to the influence of the Supreme Court just referred to, but there certainly is a basic dissimilarity-which most of the courts do not miss-between the problem of
identifying a federal income tax as a direct tax in order to invoke the
constitutional limitation of apportionment and the question of labeling
a state income tax as a property tax in order to invoke the constitutional
limitation of uniformity An inclination to follow the highest court
will not in and of itself explain the willingness of a court to adopt this
theory Rather, the idea seems to be one of the readily available con157 U S. 429 (1894); 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
Brown,
3
The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MINN, L, REV, 127, 130 (1933).
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cepts which may be used to confine and restrict legislative exercise of
the sovereign power to tax.
This explanation is well illustrated in the way the theory has been
used m Massachusetts, where it has been applied frequently and with
unusual strictness.3 35 At least two instances are in point. In the first,
the court invalidated a proposed tax on income derived from intangibles, including interest on debts and dividends from corporate stock,
by construing the exaction to be a property tax.3'0 Since the statute
exempted property other than intangibles, the legislation, in the opinion of the justices, contravened a constitutional provision requiring
property taxes to be "proportional." In the second instance, a general
graduated income tax was held unconstitutional as a property tax,
although the constitution had been amended in an attempt to give
the legislature full authority to impose a tax at different rates on income derived from different classes of property, provided it was uniform on the same class. 337 The court concluded that it was not "proportional" to graduate the tax according to the amount of income
received by the taxpayer. In other words, the power to classify property for the purpose of levying a uniform rate on each class, in the
opinion of the court, did not include the power to graduate the tax
according to the amount of income received. It was clearly the
purpose of the legislature in both statutes to provide for a uniform
and proportional system of taxation, first by devising a statutory
scheme for reaching notoriously elusive intangibles and then to graduate an exaction on individuals according to their ability to pay
It may be difficult to understand now a turn of judicial mind which
interprets the constitution and the nature of the tax so as to eliminate
two methods of taxation which have become an integral part of many
states' normal tax pattern. The most plausible explanation for it is that
the purpose of the uniformity provision, in the view of the particular
court, is to restrict the legislature in its quest for equality and fairness
,n taxation to the imposition of a proporational property tax. That is,
to confine the state's system of taxation to traditional types and modes
and to prevent innovations which might disrupt the economic status
quo. It is interesting to observe how often some phase of this general
3 Bryant v. Commissioner, 291 Mass. 498, 197 N. E. 509 (1935); Eaton v. Commissioner, 237 Mass. 523, 130 N. E. 99 (1921); Maguire v. Tax Commissioner, 230
Mass. 503, 120 N. E. 162 (1918); Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 623, 108 N. E. 570
(1915); Cf Wilcox v. County Commissioners of Middlesex County, 103 Mass. 504

(1870).

Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 623, 108 N. E. 570 (1915).
Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583. 165 N. E. 900 (1923).
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attitude is a part of the rationalization adopted in cases involving an
income tax.
SECTION 8.

A Tax on Income As Property
The theory that an income tax is on income as property is the nohon most frequently used to bring this type of taxation within the
scope of constitutional restraints on property taxation. Usually, the
l ationalization made includes two complementary ideas: (a) anything
capable of ownership is property which includes income, and (b) the
word property as used in the constitution necessarily covers anything
which will meet the ownership test. The complete argument is aptly
put in sylogistic form in the dissent to Cullington v Chase:33 8
"1

the attack on the Income Tax, briefly stated, is

tils: (a) that the Fourteenth Amendment (to the Washington Constitution) permits classification of property for purposes of taxation,

but requires uniformity of taxation on property within a given class;
(b) that the amendment defines property to be anything, tangible or
intangible, subject to ownership; (c) that income is subject to ownership; (d) that income is therefore property constituted in one class;
(e) that a graduated income tax, classifying tax-payers in groups
according to the amount of their income violates the rule of unfortuity and the act is therefore unconstitutional."

There is a certain illusory soundness about the logic underlying
the "ownership" theory when stated in this fashion which is appealing,
but there is more than ample basis for rejecting it. Typical of the
authority supporting the view is Eliasberg Brothers Mercantile Co. v
Grime, 331' where legislation imposing a graduated tax on incomes was
invalidated on the ground that it did not comply with a constitutional
provision limiting the yearly levy on property to a certain fraction of
one per cent. Recognizing directly that its decision was applicable
to other types of constitutional limitations, the court found that property in its constitutional sense includes things taxed which are susceptible of ownership and possession, and brought income within this
3 40
meaning by pointing out that:
"Money or any other thing of value, acquired as gain or
profit from capital or labor, is property; in the aggregate these acquisitions constitute income; and in accordance with the axiom that
the vhole includes all of its parts, income includes property and
nothing but property, and therefore is itself property."

Such an interpretation seems to ignore the fact that it may be double
taxation to tax a person on all the income he receives during the year
- 174 Wash. 363, 25 P 2d 81, 86 (1933).
1'204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56 (1920).
' :d. at 494, 86 So. at 58.

KEN ucKY LAw JOURNAL

as property and then tax the property into which he may have converted that income; and apparently it is of little consequence that the
property (income) may have left the owner's hands before the tax
is paid.
The significant point, however, is not that use of the ownership
theory leads to an incomplete analysis of the nature of an income tax,
but that no attempt is made in cases like this to devise a sound explanation for the type of tax imposed. All the court is trying to do is apply
a constitutional limitation. It is trying to determine the purpose or
function of the constitutional provision; trying to use the constitutional
standard in such a way as to permit or deny the imposition of a different kind of tax. It is only from this viewpoint that otherwise questionable decisions are understandable. To criticize the conclusion that an
income tax is a property tax without appreciating this fact is to engage
in the same pursuit for conceptual consistency which the courts follow
with limited success. It is apparent, therefore, that the function or
purpose of the constitution as determined from the particular provision
under consideration is the critical factor underlying the decision 3in
41
cases such as this. On this point tlhe Eliasberg case is crystal clear:
"1

the purpose of the Constitution (is) to protect

the property of the citizen against forced contribution or legislative
plunder."
Similar ideas about the purpose of constitutional limitations are reflected in the leading case of Bachrach v Nelson, 42 where the Illinois
court found that the constitution would not permit an income tax graduated at progressive rates according to the amount of income earned,
because "income is property" and a tax on it, like all other property
taxes, must be imposed according to value so that every person and
corporation will pay a tax in proportion to the valuation of his property
Since a tax on property by means of a graduated scale which increases
in rate as applied to increases from property is not according to value,
the legislature is limited by such an interpretation to use of the traditional ad valorem property tax as a primary source for revenue, particularly where the pertinent constitutional provisions are mistakenly
conceived to be an exclusive grant or enumeration of the state's taxing
power. 343 Thus in effect the constitutional limitation serves to prevent
necessary reform and revision in the over-all tax structure, and it is
311id. at 497, 86 So. at 61.
-42
394 Il. 579, 182 N. E. 909 (1932).
Is Any Desirable Type of General Income Tax
nois? 35 ILL, L, 1EV, 730, 735 (1941).
33Note,

Constiztqioial ;n

Illi-
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interesting to note in this connection that the social and economic
344
implications in the Bachrach decision were fully appreciated:
"Whether this law would be desirable from an economic
standpoint or as a matter of public policy is something of which this
court can take not cognizance, as we are clothed with the power and
primarily intrusted with the duty of maintaimng the fundamental
law of the constitution."

As will be shown m developing the other theories of an income tax,
there are at least tvo ways to overcome the consequences of the ownership theory One is to question the court's analysis of the nature of
the tax, and the other is to evaluate the court's understanding of the
function of the constitutional limitation as well as its role as guardian
of the fundamental law Although the latter method seems to be more
realistic, the former is usually adopted unless the constitution expressly
provides that "
the word property as used herein shall mean and
include everything whether tangible or intangible subject to ownership."
In Cullington v Chase,345 the court found that such a provision
coupled with a normal provision requiring property taxes to be uniform within a class prevented the imposition of a graduated tax on
income, although the particular legislation originated through the
Initiative; and stated in its preamble that existing methods of taxation,
based primarily on property holdings, were inadequate, unequal and
economically unsound. Tis clear statement led to a vigorous dissent
which is worthy of close attention for what it reveals about the underlying controversy in such a case. After describing the history of taxation in Washington leading to a demand for the graduated income tax,
34
Justice Blake put the problem bluntly 6
"As I see it, the real question presented on tlus appeal
is whether by construction of this amendment we are going to thwart
the effort of the state to throw off the strait-jacket in which it was
bound."

Then he leveled an attack on the ownership theory by suggesting that
it is "sheer sophistry" to include income within a broad constitutional
347
definition of property because:
"Even assuming that the income tax is a property tax it

must still be borne in mind that the state constitution is not a grant
of power; it is a limitation. So the real question is: Have the people,
by the enactment of the Amendment, placed a limitation upon their
own inherent power of taxation which renders them impotent to
" 294 Ill. 579, 182 N. E. 909, 915 (1932).
i4; 174 Wash. 365, 25 P 2d 81
(1933).
id. at 368, 25 P 2d at 86.
17 id. at 369, 25 P 2d at 87-88.
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impose an income tax on themselves?

I fail to see wherein

there is any limitation (contained in the uniformity provision) other
than that real estate shall constitute one class."

The argument that an income tax is not a property tax and that the
word uniform as used in a uniform within the class provision anticipates rather than denies reasonable classification seems unanswerable. And what is more important it affirms by necessary inference
that the purpose of the constitution is not to prevent the establishment
of a different and more equitable method of taxation, especially where
the incentive for it stems from popular demand.
In applying the theory that an income tax is a property tax a distinction is sometimes made between a tax on net income and a tax on
gross income. In Redfield v Fisher,348 for instance, the Oregon court
held a tax on the net income of corporations an excise tax, but a tax
on the gross income from intangibles in the hands of individual stockbrokers a property tax, both on the property from which the income
-vas derived and on the income itself as property Although the court
suggested that the power to impose an excise on the privilege of doing
business in corporate form does not extend to doing business as an
individual, the clear point was made that a tax on gross income, like a
tax on gross receipts, is but a way of measuring the value of property
and therefore is a property tax. The distinction seems to rest in part
on the belief that gross income gives but little indication of an ability
to pay, but the courts which adopt it rely generally on the rationalization that any tax measured by receipts is a tax on the receipts directly
Obvious fallicies in this rationalization-at least where the uniformity
provisions are concerned-have been pointed out in discussing franchise taxes, sales taxes, gross receipts taxes, and other taxes which
may be labeled property or non-property in nature, and are equally
9
applicable in connection with the income tax.
By way of contrast, at least one income tax has been sustained on
the theory that income is property for the purposes of taxation. In
State v Pender,350 the statute was attacked on the basis that certain
exemptions violated a constitutional provision requiring taxes to be
uniform on the same class of subjects and that another provision limited
the legislature to imposition of property taxes only The Delaware
Court denied the taxpayers contention by reasoning that the latter
provision was a limitation and not a grant of power and that the two
provisions taken together did not mean that taxes must be uniform on
all property or that taxation of property must be in proportion to value.
s135 Ore. 180, 292 Pac. 813 (1930).
See discussion supra p. 377 et seq.
(1909).
'o 30 Del. 416, 108 Ad. 43
"'
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SECTION 4.
As a Property Tax Not Subject to the Uniformity Provision
Most income tax legislation is sustained on the basis that the tax
imposed is an excise, 351 but it is upheld as property taxation under
some constitutions on the theory that the uniformity clause and other
restrictive provisions apply only to certain traditional property taxes.
Such a finding usually is motivated by a feeling that some permissive
interpretation of the constitution is essential to a broader exercise of
the taxing power. It is useful in avoiding the delicate task of defining
the nature of the tax initially and in distinguishing persuasive precedent in favor of the property tax theory In contrast to those already
discussed, this theory does not involve a detailed examination of the
tax, but directs attention to the meaning and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision, especially that part of it which gives some
indication of its scope and application. This puts the emphasis of
judicial examination on the constitution where it should be, rather than
on the statute.
Thus in Shields v Williams,352 the Tennessee court sustained a tax
on the income from stocks and bonds without taking a position as to
the nature of the tax, because it found that the uniformity provision reso that taxes
quiring "all property to be taxed according to value
shall be equal and uniform throughout the state" is limited to ad
valorein property taxes and is not applicable to a tax imposed under
another section of the constitution authorizing an income tax on stocks
and bonds not taxed ad valorem. And in Deifendorf v Gallett,53 it is
clearly indicated that the crux of the matter under this theory is
whether income can be considered as property for purposes of taxation within the. true scope and meaning of the constitution and not
whether income is some specie of property, although the court finally
decided that income taxes are excises.
The Missouri court seems to have used the theory with as much
understanding of its implications and significance as any other. As
early as 1869 they held a tax on income not subject to a provision in
the constitution requiring the taxation of property according to value,
and in Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v Wollbrink,354 used similar reasoning
to sustain one of the first modem state income taxes patterned after
351See discussion, znfra p. 512.
a5 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S. W 2d 261 (1929).
a 51 Idaho 619, 10 P 2d 307 (1932).
"-275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196 (1918).
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the federal statute of that day In the latter case the constitutionality
of the tax was attacked under the ad valorem requirement on the
theory that property included income and also under another provision
requiring all taxes to be uniform on the same class of subjects. In
disposing of the first contention, the court conceded that income is
property because it is an ownable thing and that a tax on it is in effect
a tax on the capital or labor which produced it. But they correctly
emphasized that the legislature has an inherent power to legislate in
any way it sees fit unless expressly restrained by the constitution, including the power to tax property not contemplated by the constitution without consideration of its value. With respect to the second
contention, the court was equally certain that classification of persons
and corporations according to the amount of net income earned, including a class composed of persons whose income taxes exceed those
paid on their real and personal property, is not contrary to the uniformity provision because such distinctions are founded in "reason, in
justice and for the utility of the public-the true criterion which should
govern all legislative action" 35In a sense the instant theory offers a method for interpreting pertinent constitutional provisions in such a way as to do justice to prevalent notions about the nature of a tax without subjecting the taxing
power to undue restraint. Before adopting it, however, one should
appreciate fully at least two of the basic issues involved: (a) the social
consequences of the tax legislation, and (b) the extent to which the
constitution tends to be outmoded in its provisions relating to taxation.
Both are described with considerable candor in the Ludlow case.35
SECrION 5.

As An Exczse Tax
The conception of the income tax as an excise is very useful in
solving uniformity problems although it is difficult to define an excise
so as to be certain that a tax on income is in this category Occasionally this kind of tax is labeled sut generis357 or treated as a personal
tax,35 8 but usually it is considered analogous to other clearly-defined
excises such as license fees, privilege taxes, franchise taxes, inheritance taxes et cetera. Thus a corporate income tax is an excise on the
right to do business in corporate form, and a tax on an individuals
= td. at 341, 205 S. W at 200.
3ibzd.

31 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932); Owen v. Fletcher
Savings Company, 99 Ind. App. 365, 189 N. E. 173 (1934); For a full discussion sce
Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 14 MINN. L. REV. 127 (1933).
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income may well be regarded as a tax on the act of earning or receiving income.359 This interpretation seems to rest on the assumption
that the uniformity provisions do not apply to property taxes, so that
it is not necessary to define the subject or nature of the tax categorically in order to determine the effect of the constitutional limitation.
In this way the theory is used to free an income tax, as well as other
methods of taxation, from the restrictive effect of a constitutional provision which may require taxation according to value or not permit
sufficient leeway in the classification of persons and subjects to allow
effective imposition of the tax.
As a general rationalization of the function of the uniformity provisions, however, this explanation is not entirely complete. It permits
the observation made many times that the nature of the tax is basic
in the constitutionality of any tax. It recognizes by inference at least
that a restrictive type provision strictly applied serves to limit unduly
the effective use of the taxing power. It also points up the fact that
there is little occasion for finally categorizing the nature of an income
tax so long as it is not regarded as a property tax. But it fails to account for the important fact that some uniformity provisions seem to
opply to all taxes whether excise or property Normally this type of
provision requires uniformity within a class only, so that it may be no
more restrictive than an equal protection clause, but failure to discriminate in this respect is sometimes the source of considerable confusion.
It is less confusing if we keep in mmd this essential thing about the
relation of the constitution to excise (income) tax legislation: if the
nature of the tax is problematical, the effect of the restrictive type
uniformity clause is determined by its scope or applicability; but, if
the tax is clearly an excise, a uniform within the class provision may
serve as the basis for prescribing the limits within which the legislature
must exercise its power to classify and exempt the subjects of taxation.3 110 Most of the time these essentially distinct problems are
treated indiscriminately.
Most of the characteristics of the excise theory as it is used to
mark out the scope of a uniformity provision are apparent m the often
cited case of Hattisburg Grocery Company v. Roberts,301 where the
taxpayer contested a tax on all annual incomes in excess of a certain
amount on the assumption that a tax on income is a tax on specific
property, from the value of which the income must be computed; and
: Cook v. Tait. 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
Brown, op. cit. supra note 357, p. 512 at 139.
See discussion supra p. 406 et seq.
'126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 (1921).
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that a tax on income derived from property is a tax on the property
from which the income is derived. Both ideas were refuted on the
ground that it is a fundamental error to completely disassociate gains
derived from capital and labor, or both, from the activities of the
person taxed. In other words, the subject of the tax is not the specific
property but the performance of an act by the taxpayer, the act of
producing, receiving and enjoying income. And since the income is
necessarily a product of the joint effort of the state and the individual,
the former may properly impose an excise to reach a portion of it. This
explanation, analytical though it is, is consistent with the privilege
tax cases discussed before, and can be reconciled with the always
troublesome Pollock Cases, at least with the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of them. More pertinent to our immediate
problem, however, is the extent to which it permits a rational interpretation of the purpose. of the constitutional limitation. On this point
362
the Mississippi court is rather specific:
"The section contains no language even remotely indicat-

ing that its purpose is to withdraw from the legislature the power to
tax any species of property or any of the activities of persons who

enjoy the protection of the States laws, but such would be its effect
if a tax on income derived from property should be held to be necessarily a tax on the property from which the income was derived; for
it would then necessarily follow that a tax on specific property derived as gain from other property, on the value of which income

must be computed, would also be a tax on the property from which
it is derived."
The theory is used with equal success to sustain an income tax
under a more inclusive uniformity clause. Thus where the constitution provides that "all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class
of subjects and ad valorem on all property" a tax on income may be
graduated because it is not a property tax.3 3 And even though property subject to be taxed must be treated as a single class, such a uniformity provision does not require the tax to be the same on all classes
or uniform with the tax imposed on property, for the legislature has
full power to classify the subjects of taxation other than property
subject only to the limitation that the classification must be reasonable
and not arbitrary Also, under this interpretation there is no objection
to a progressive tax on income since the power to classify would seem
to include the right to fix the ratio of graduation in rate between
classes.
id. at 35, 88 So. at 5.
-' Standard Lumber Company v. Pierce, 112 Ore. 314, 228 Pac. 812 (1924t);
Featherstone v. Morman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930).
2-2
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SECTION 6.

Summary
In summary, the implications of the excise theory should be pointed
out briefly in connection with three other situations involving an income tax and the uniformity clause. In the first place, if it is not used,
the only alternative leading to a successful distribution of the tax burden according to the ability to pay is to aniend the constitution so as
to permit specifically a progressive graduation of the tax. This is
clearly shown in Wisconsin's experience with the income tax where
the constitution was amended in 1908.364 In a similar way, the idea
may be used to overcome an unwarranted extension of the uniformity
clause by judicial precedent. Tis method was used in the interesting
case of Reynolds Metal Company v. Martin, 65 where the Kentucky
court was confronted with a long line of cases holding that the principles of uniformity and equality called for in a section of the constitution expressly limited to property taxes applied to all taxes. Finally,
if there is no uniformity clause applicable to excises directly it would
ceem that an income tax may be levied only subject to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In fact, it is sometimes suggested that this is the true meaning
of the uniformity provision in any event.
It seems accurate to conclude that the function of the uniformity
provisions in regard to income tax legislation is consistent with the
result reached by the courts in considering the constitutionality of
other types of taxes. The fact that an income tax is not exactly like
any other kind of tax does put a strain on the technique of invoking
the constitutional limitation on the basis of an analytical examination
of the nature of the tax, but where a court feels constrained to do so,
there is decent authority for its decision. In this way the uniformity
provision can be made to serve as a bamer against a new and differ
ent method of taxation. On the other hand, it is possible to restrict
effectively the scope of constitutional uniformity, and therefore its
purpose or function, by concluding that an income tax is not a tax on
property as defined by the constitution, or is an excise. In so doing,
many courts recognize that it is not the proper function of the constitution to saddle the government with traditional and inadequate
methods for raising revenue such as the ad valorem property tax.
Finally, the fact that an income tax is most often thought of as an
excise makes it possible to conceive of uniformity as virtually synonyinous with equal protection since excises are usually subject to the kind
of provision which requires uniformity within the class only.
'1 State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912).
35269 Ky. 378, 107 S. IV. 2d 251 (1937).
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CHAPTER IX
UNIFORMITY AND TAX LEGISLATION SUMMARIZED
In summarizing this analysis of the way the uniformity provisious
are used in determining the constitutionality of specific tax legislation
it is possible to reiterate only a few of the more important observations
made in regard to (1) taxes clearly in the nature of property taxes,
(2) taxes which may be labeled property or non-property (3) taxes
clearly non-property in nature and (4) income taxes.
As to the first type of legislation, it seems clear that the property
tax label is used infrequently in an attempt to confine to a few taxes
the restrictive effect of uniformity provisions which pertain to property
taxation. The effect of these provisions on the general property tax
is dependent largely on whether the legislation is attacked for want
of uniformity in rate or for lack of uniformity in assessment. Strict
application of the uniformity concept in either instance prevents the
classification of property for tax purposes, but there is general relaxation of the traditional rule through amendment of the constitution or
liberal interpretation of existing provisions. It is difficult to generalize
in regard to such liberal interpretation, although its use does
permit the classification of property according to kind or use,
but not according to unusual distinctions between owners.
Also, there is a reluctance to deviate from a narrow interpretation in the case of real property, probably on the theory that there
is less occasion for finding valid distinctions as to kind or species. The
single thread of consistency in all the cases dealing with property
classification is the court's concern for the importance of value, although there is little justification for keeping uniformity irrevocably
tied to value beyond the traditional notion underlying the general
property tax that an ad valorem system is essential to an equal distribution of the expenses of government. Practical defects in the ad
valorem method are very apparent in the administration of the property tax, particularly where uniformity'functions as the basis for testing
the validity of the assessment made, and violations of the constitutional
provision resulting from administrative classification of property are
almost impossible to rectify judicially Where the uniformity provisions are applied strictly they defeat any attempt to assess intangibles at a lower rate in order to get them on the tax rolls, and it is
precisely here that the traditional function of the constitutional limitation was first challenged, although it is generally recognized now that
such classification and exemption can be made. Finally, where a
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uniform within the class rule is applied to property taxation, there
seems to be little reason for drawing unusual distinctions as to the
kind of property which may constitute a class, for this places undue
emphasis on the function of the uniformity provisions as a restriction
on the taxing power.
With respect to the second type of legislation, it should be recognized that nearly every kind of tax imaginable has been contested on
the theory that it is subject to the constitutional restrictions generally
applicable to property taxation. Usually, however, excise, occupation,
privilege, license, sales, use and inheritance taxes are sustained as nonproperty in character; but, if the object and method of the legislation
are not absolutely clear, even these may be held unconstitutional. For
instance, a franchise tax can be rqmoved from the uniformity rule on
a privilege tax theory, but if the statute imposing it provides for some
method of return comparable to a property tax valuation, it may be
invalid. The function of uniformity is well-portrayed in cases dealing
with a gross receipts tax, especially where the constitutional provision
is archaic and creates a difficult situation for the legislature by denying
it the power to classify property The legislature may misconceive
the extent of its power under the Federal Constitution and attempt to
levy a property tax according to value measured by gross receipts so
that the uniformity clause prevents the tax altogether, or at least
effective classification. On the other hand, if the valuation provision
is removed, and the nature of the tax is not labeled, the tax can be
sustained as a tax on a business privilege. The privilege explanation
is used also to uphold a tax on receipts derived from sales, as well as
severance taxes and use taxes. As far as these last two are concerned,
the function of uniformity is dependent on how the courts apply an
ownership test or a use test in determining the nature of the tax. Both
these tests are open to the criticism that they unduly emphasize the
analytical method of letting the nature of the tax be decisive, and fail
to account for all the factors involved in deciding whether the constitutional limitations should be invoked. It is rather clear that the
Supreme Court has contributed to the confusion by suggesting that
the ownership theory is conclusive as to a tax imposed by a state,
although it has often refused to so hold where the question of apportioning a direct tax under the Federal Constitution was involved. Actually, there is no certain and final basis for determining the category
into which this kind of tax legislation will fall in every case, for the
label used is necessarily influenced by the courts willingness or reluctance to invoke a constitutional limitation on the legislature's power
to tax.
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In so far as taxes clearly non-property in nature are concerned, the
ordinary provision requiring uniformity is not a major obstacle. This
kind of legislation is characterized in a broad way as excise tax legislation, and is sustained generally on the basis that it imposes a levy on
privileges rather than directly against property Therefore it is not
subject to the retnctive rules of uniformity applicable to a property
tax. Further, when a court rules on the constitutionality of this type
of legislation, its concern with the nature of the tax is secondary to a
consideration of problems of classification and exemption. Thus it is
clear that an inheritance tax is not a property tax, but this does not
necessarily mean that the power to impose it is unlimited, for it is
sometiies suggested that a uniformity clause does not permit certain
methodsroprogressive graduation not objectionable under the Fourt1thithgAme'ndment. In this connection, it must be admitted that a
court may invade the broad field of legislative discretion in classification at some point, and the concept of uniformity is simply the nearest
available weapon when such an invasion is made. In a sense, cases
involving this type of taxation illustrate that most problems of uniformity are really a contest between the legislature in its exercise of a
broad power to tax and the court in its exercise of an equally effective
power to interpret constitutional limitations on that power. It would
seem also that there is no real reason for exploring the intricate nature
of various kinds of taxes or for questioning the authority to levy the
particular tax, because the legislature admittedly has full power in
matters of taxation. In other words, the court should narrow the judicial problem to a determination of the extent to which the legislature,
under the constitution, can discnminate between persons and subjects
in imposing a tax that is clearly non-property in nature. The general
rationalization used in upholding inheritance taxes is carried over and
a plied to legislation imposing many other kinds of taxes such as
license fees, business taxes, gasoline taxes et cetera. The increasing
importance of this kind of taxation reflects a judicial willingness to
abandon or modify the practice of using rigid, conceptualistic tests in
interpreting the uniformity provisions. Finally, there are no obvious
legal or economic policies in favor of subjecting the legislature's power
to levy an excise tax to a greater restraint than that imposed on legislative power generally by constitutional provisions requiring equal protection of the laws. There is no sound reason for extending constitutional uniformity to cover all forms of taxation.
With respect to income tax legislation, the function of the uniformity provisions is consistent with the analysis already summarized.
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The constitution may serve as an unnecessary barrier to effective
imposition of an income tax or it may permit reasonable classification
and progressive graduation depending on how this essentially distinctive method of taxation is categorized. In either case, the critical
problem is how to reconcile the uniformity clause with a comparatively
new and different method of raising revenue which purports to achieve
fairness and equality by distributing the expense of government on the
basis of an ability to pay The reconciliation is made or rejected by
calling the tax a property tax (on the property which produces the income and on income as property), a property tax not subject to a particular constitutional limitation, or an excise. In any event, many
courts appreciate that it is more realistic to emphasize directly the
purpose and function of the constitutional limitation than it is to*rely
entirely on an analytical examination of the tax. This frequently
results in the sound conclusion that the uniformity provisions are no
more of a limitation on the state's power to tax than provisions calling
for equal protection in all legislation.
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PART IV

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
CHAPMR X

UNIFORMITY AS A "RULE-LIKE" CONCEPT
This study of constitutional uniformity in taxation began with attention focused on the function and use of the state constitutional
provisions and it seems appropriate to conclude it by repeating some
of the observations already made and by stating those consequences
and implications which point to a more realistic rationalization of the
idea, especially those which are sufficiently clear to be worthy of generalization. Even in concluding it is important to keep m mind that
uniformity, like many other constitutional concepts, has accurate
meaning only when described in relation to a particular constitutional
provision as applied to a certain type of tax statute imposed for a
specific purpose, and any general statement about it tends to be misleading. Some crystalization of ideas is essential to useful analysis,
however, and one really interested in piercing the "veil of sacerdotal
conceptualism," 3 66 must suggest some reasonably inclusive, different
and realistic way of looking at constitutional uniformity
To summarize first, the historical origins of uniformity in taxation
are obscure. The idea appeared in the state constitutions because of
a popular demand for elimination of the practical inequalities resulting from wide-spread use of the general property tax with its everexpanding tax base, and was given constitutional rather than statutory
expression because that demand coincided with a general movement
to restrict the power of the legislature at a time when the country was
undergoing great growth both in land settlement and in the initial
change from an agricultural to a commercial and industrial economy
Although the historical origins of the constitutional provisions are
obscure, their purpose is to bring about an equality of burden in taxation; but it is not always clear what kind of equality of burden is meant
and surprisingly little judicial attention is given to the possible theories
of burden.
From a functional viewpoint the uniformity provisions may be interpreted and described generally in terms of phraseology, scope and
"mLowndes, Spurious Conceptions in the Constitutional Law of Taxation. 47
HARV, L, Rxv, 628, 659 (1934). See discussion p. 34.
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effect. As to phraseology, there is the kind of provision which refers
to a general standard for taxation and the kind which refers to an
ad valorem rule normally applicable to property taxation. As to scope,
a provision requiring either kind of uniformity may be limited to
property taxes or may apply to non-property taxation, and more than
one type of uniformity may be used in the same jurisdiction to reconcile two or more uniformity clauses in the same constitution. As to
effect, the principal role of the provisions is to limit the power to tax,
and tis limiting effect is directly related to the legislature's power to
classify Thinking of the constitutional requirement in this way makes
possible a comparison of the effect of the uniformity provisions and
the effect of the equal protection provisions of the federal and state
constitutions. In fact, the courts of the various states can be grouped
into those which regard uniformity as more restrictive than equal protection, those which regard the two ideas as virtually synonymous, and
those which conceive that constitutional uniformity in point of restrictive effect lies somewhere between absolute uniformity and equal
protection.
The best way to isolate the use and function of the uniformity provisions is to examine their application by the courts in determining the
constitutionality of specific tax legislation. The usual judicial technique of application is to categorize taxes according to their nature,
and in many cases the nature of the tax is considered decisive so that
no further decision is necessary Where the kind of uniformity required by a particular constitutional provision is considered inapplicable to the kind of tax involved the critical problem is to determine
the effect of the other provisions in the constitution requiring uniformity within the class, if any Use of this technique leads to and
results from an unrealistic application of the constitutional standard
on the basis of the kind of tax involved or on the basis of the extent
of classification permitted under the constitution. To fully appreciate
the details and ramifications of this process one must visualize uniformity in relation to taxes clearly in the nature of property taxes, taxes
which may be labeled property or non-property, taxes clearly nonproperty in nature and income taxes. This analysis has been made in
a separate section of the study and is summarized there.
As to implications, every phase of this study points to the conclusion that the uniformity provisions are the prime source of a "rulelike" standard used to limit the taxing power. Such a description of
the function of the provisions is not too startling and is in accord with
the orthodox legal and political tradition that our state constitutions
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are but a basic statement of the confines within which the government
must operate. But the necessary implication m this conclusion: that
the uniformity limitation is a "rule", or at least is a constitutional requirement susceptable of "rule-like" application, is worthy of the
closest attention. As a rationalization of the uniformity problem, it
carries with it additional implications of sufficient importance to warrant critical evaluation here.
In the first place, "rule-like" application of this particular constitutional limitation simply compounds the confusion and misunderstanding necessarily present in any uniformity situation because of the difference in phraseology, scope and effect of the various constitutional
provisions. The misconception that the constitutional requirement for
uniformity can be applied to any specific tax pattern as if it were a
nice, precise, distinct rule for determining the effect of the tax on a
given taxpayer is best reflected in the equally false idea that distinguishing characteristics of a modern, complicated tax statute can be
distilled down to a point where the nature of the tax can be categorically labeled. Both are a conceptual impossibility It is difficult
to conclude whether the labeling process leads to the "rule-like" application of the constitutional limitation or vice versa, but the total result
is increased confusion.
Moreover, precise application of the "rule" often leads to ridiculous results; and the drawing of fine lines of distinction between kinds
of taxes or between permissable classifications in tax statutes may
determine their validity, but it will not and-does not alter their similarity Judicial consistency frequently is impossible where such a
method is used to explain why one tax is constitutional and another
is not. The judicial patience and persistence necessary to achieve
sound application of a constitutional rule to the endless assortment of
taxes and types of classification conceivably possible in a modern
society is more than can be expected of the courts. The most they
have ever hoped for in applying these provisions in this way is an
approximate equality, but such approximation as they have achieved
rests on a hierarchy of judicial comparison, deliniation and distinction
which is most confusing. A sentence or two in a constitution written
a hundred years ago simply will not serve as a rule of thumb for the
validity of tax statutes devised to produce governmental revenue from
a complicated modern economy
In the second place, when a constitutional standard is thought of
as a rule, or is applied m rule fashion, there is a tendency to regard
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it as permanent and unchanging This lack of flexibility is apparent
in many of the uniformity cases. Since the requirement is one provided for in the constitution the only relief from this tendency lies in
the comparatively laborious process of constitutional amendment. The
whole economic life of any modem community-national, state or
local-changes rapidly, especially those economic factors which determine who is best able to provide any given share of the costs of government. And the cost of government itself changes so that the amount
of burden to be borne equally is never the same. Unless our notions
about the best way to accomplish equality of burden in taxation can
be revised and revalued periodically they become outmoded and less
sensitive to the current needs of the taxpayer and his government.
Witness the many instances where a state has found itself saddled with
the general property tax because of a strict constitutional rule for
uniformity or taxation according to value. A court may disavow this
tendency m its interpretation of the uniformity provisions, but usually
it will decide the constitutionality of a modern tax statute on the basis
of what it said or decided about the uniformity of a different kind of
tax long before.
In the third place, using uniformity as a "rule" makes for an unrealistic restriction of the taxing power. It tends to confuse the true
issues rather than to clarify them by directing the court's attention
unnecessarily to the mechanical details of applying its rule. The court
becomes engrossed in exploring the nature of the tax or in analyzing
the basis for the classification attempted and loses sight of the purpose
of the statute, the revenue needs behind its enactment, its relation to
other legislation in the whole tax structure and its effect on all taxpayers in contrast to its effect on the particular taxpayer who is contesting its validity In- point of fact, when a court finds that a tax
statute contravenes the uniformity provision it is doing more than
labeling the nature of a legislative imposed levy and letting the chips
of legality fall where they may It really is striking at one of the government's most vital and vulnerable powers, the power to tax. Such
action is well within the judicial power as we have always explained
it, but infrequent recognition of its exercise and the consequences
flowing therefrom is not conducive to realistic use of the power. Nearly
all the rationalizations, explanations and reasons given by the courts
for their decisions in these uniformity cases are in terms of applying
narrow, specific, constitutional rules in an unimaginative and coldly,
analytical manner. Both the attitude and the technique leave one with
the impression that little consideration is given to the numerous other
factors involved,
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Admittedly, one may think of constitutional uniformity as a rule
and still apply it mnlight of all the things, constitutionally expressed
-and otherwise, which should be considered in determining whether
the particular exercise of the taxing power is proper, but few do it.
Attention is diverted to the less important, and often insoluble problem
of trying to fit a loosely worded constitutional clause to a complicated
statutory pattern for raising revenue. This criticism may be one pertaming to emphasis rather than fundamental attitude or rationalization,
but it is none the less important, for judicial emphasis can be quite
decisive in tax cases. The struggle to modernize taxing methods in
which all states have engaged at one time or the other has been waged
around a conflict between the legislatures and the courts as to what
is a valid exercising of the taxing power. Few new taxes, or new
methods of imposing a traditional tax, have successfully avoided running the gamut of judicial interpretation without benefit of an analysis
of the fiscal, economic and social factors which led to imposition of
the legislation in the first instance. In jealously guarding the taxpayer
from many of the benefits of scientific taxation the courts have invoked
the uniformity provisions many times to find new tax legislation unconstitutional. In so doing they have relied heavily on the "rule char-

acteristics" of the constitutional
How should the uniformity
proper function and how would
formity in a new way? Many

requirement.
provisions be used? What is their
it help to think of constitutional uniof the uniformity cases have within

them two suggestions leading to a more effective explanation of the

uniformity provisions and their function. First, they suggest that uniformity in taxation is a broad, general objective of the constitution
rather than a narrow, specific limitation. Secondly, they suggest that
application of the traditional uniformity "rule" actually amounts to a
ludicial evaluation of the kind of tax pattern involved, the distinctive
differences in classification attempted and other economic and social
factors. This evaluation seems to rest in part on clear principles, but
necessarily includes certain logical considerations of a court. Combining these two ideas, it is apparent that the usual difficulty in achieving uniformity might well be avoided by treating constitutional uniformity as a general objective for the legislature in its exercise of the
taxing power rather than as a mere limiting rule on that power. Calling uniformity what it is, i.e., a judicially recognized and admittedly
general constitutional principle, rather than what it is not, i.e., a welldefined constitutional limitation, would encourage all concerned to see
if this particular purpose of the constitution is being realized in current
tax legislation. If the legislatures and the courts were to so rationalize
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uniformity, what would be the effect on the exercise of the taxing
power and the consequence to the rights and interests of the persons
and business subjected to that power?
A better orientation of the taxing power is the important implication in the suggested idea. As already shown, this orientation is described usually as fairness in taxation, which is taken to mean equality
of burden or equality in bearing the expense of the government. If
uniformity were recognized more directly as a goal of fairness toward
which the taxing power is directed, more attention could be given to
the possible methods available for achieving equality of burden. There
would be more opportunity to consider the overall effect of the tax on
the public in relation to other essential factors, particularly its place
in the entire tax structure. It is doubtful whether true, practical, economic equality in taxation can ever be attained without full integration of the whole system of taxation. This rationalization would encourage such action rather than deter it. Of course, a court or a legislature may consider the question of fairness of burden in the applicahon of the uniformity provisions as a rule, but the emphasis is different. The affirmative approach to uniformity helps one keep clearly in
mind that broad equality of burden is the ultimate end of all taxation.
With tls basic thought as a guide one can make more rational decisions as to whether equality of burden is more closely related to
ability to pay than to the value of that which is owned, or whether it
is more closely connected to the volume of business done rather than
the number of stores owned in the state, et cetera. The choice of bases
for distributing fairly the burdens of taxation is a matter of policy and
constitutional uniformity should be the criterion in the fundamental
law toward which the policy makers move, rather than a "rule-like"
barrier through which they break at their own risk. So long as the
criterion is sufficiently general to be flexible, much of the confusion
attributable to the rule characteristics of the provisions would be
eliminated.
Aside from a natural reluctance to alter a traditional view, major
objection to the rationalization proposed might center around two
fears: (1) that it permits an increase in legislative discretion in determng the bases for achieving equality of burden in taxation, and (2)
that under it the state taxing power is subject to considerably less constitutional restraint. Perhaps these fears can be adequately dispelled
by additional reflection on the idea.
As to the first, no appreciable shift in governmental responsibility
is contemplated or required in suggesting that constitutional uniformity
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be thought of as an objective rather than a rule. What is suggested is
simply a change in technique. The extent of legislative power or discretion would be no more and no less than it is now in respect to any
legislation, tax or otherwise. The legislature would continue to
initiate the particular tax, but it would so devise the pattern of its
legislation as to bring about over-all uniformity and equality of burden
in the entire tax structure in view of modern economic conditions. And
it would so legislate with less fear of its efforts being rendered futile
by the restrictive application of constitutional limitations. The courts
would continue to exercise a judicial function and would retain all
their usual prerogatives over legislative action. They would still determine whether the statute is compatible with the constitution and have
the right to say that the taxing power is not being used to impose a
tax in the fashion required by the fundamental law They still would
be the interpreters and guardians of the constitution in the sense that
they could decide without legislative or popular interference whether
the general objectives of the constitution as to uniformity in taxation
were being met. The judicial power and function would not be encroached .upon in any conceivable way What the proposed viewpoint
involves basically is that the legislature, the court and the taxpayer
should become more aware of the real function of uniformity That is,
they should shift their attention and emphasis to the constitutional
requirement directly and use it as a guiding, affirmative, general principle so as to minimize much of the confusion which results from endlessly trying to fit a constitutionally expressed generality to the
particulars of a given tax statute as it affects the special problem of one
taxpayer.
As to the second fear, one need only remember the comparisons
already made between uniformity and equal protection. The trend
in the decisions as to the similarity in effect of the state constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity and the Fourteenth Amendment requiring equal protection has reached a point where we must conclude
that they no longer complement each other, but overlap so much that
the limiting effect of the uniformity provisions is no longer necessary
to a well confined taxing power. Even if the uniformity provisions
were stricken from the state constitutions entirely, it is rather clear
,that effective limitation of the taxing power would be adequately
provided for by the Federal Constitution. This suggests the final observation that the primary function, and the best purpose, of constitutional uniformity as derived from the state constitutional provisions is
to serve as a general objective for any exercise of the taxing power.

